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Abstract. The gas mechanism in Ethereum charges the execution of ev-
ery operation to ensure that smart contracts running in EVM (Ethereum
Virtual Machine) will be eventually terminated. Failing to properly set
the gas costs of EVM operations allows attackers to launch DoS at-
tacks on Ethereum. Although Ethereum recently adjusted the gas costs
of EVM operations to defend against known DoS attacks, it remains
unknown whether the new setting is proper and how to configure it to
defend against unknown DoS attacks. In this paper, we make the first
step to address this challenging issue by first proposing an emulation-
based framework to automatically measure the resource consumptions of
EVM operations. The results reveal that Ethereum’s new setting is still
not proper. Moreover, we obtain an insight that there may always exist
exploitable under-priced operations if the cost is fixed. Hence, we pro-
pose a novel gas cost mechanism, which dynamically adjusts the costs of
EVM operations according to the number of executions, to thwart DoS
attacks. This method punishes the operations that are executed much
more frequently than before and lead to high gas costs. To make our so-
lution flexible and secure and avoid frequent update of Ethereum client,
we design a special smart contract that collaborates with the updated
EVM for dynamic parameter adjustment. Experimental results demon-
strate that our method can effectively thwart both known and unknown
DoS attacks with flexible parameter settings. Moreover, our method only
introduces negligible additional gas consumption for benign users.
1 Introduction
Being the second largest blockchain [8], Ethereum distinguishes itself by its
Turing-complete execution environment(i.e, EVM) [19] that can run various ap-
plications through smart contracts. Besides transferring money, transactions in
Ethereum are also involved in deploying and invoking smart contracts. To ensure
that the execution of smart contracts will be terminated eventually, Ethereum
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charges gas (i.e., execution fee) from transaction senders, and lets it be part of
the rewards to miners for executing smart contracts. In particular, gas serves
as a protection mechanism against resources abusing in case executing certain
smart contracts consumes lots of computing resources. The money paid for ex-
ecuting an EVM operation (e.g., addition, multiplication, reading the balance
of an account) is the multiplication of the gas price with the gas cost of that
operation, where the gas price indicates the value of one unit of gas and the gas
cost of an EVM operation stands for the units of gas required to execute the
operation. The gas cost is determined by the EVM in Ethereum client, and the
gas price can be set by transaction senders. Every transaction has a gas limit,
dubbed TGL (Transaction Gas Limit), so that the execution of a smart contract
will trigger an out-of-gas exception if the execution requires more gas than the
TGL. Ethereum attempts to associate EVM operations’ gas costs proportionally
to the computing resources needed to execute them[19], because a proper setting
of gas costs can give miners proper awards and thwart DoS attackers who aim
at wasting a large amount of resources.
However, it is non-trivial to properly set the gas cost of each operation be-
cause it requires a deep understanding of EVM internals, an accurate measure-
ment of resource consumptions by EVM operations, and the awareness of the
market price for different types of computing resources (e.g., CPU, memory, etc.).
Failing to select suitable gas costs for EVM operations gives attackers opportu-
nities to launch DoS attacks on Ethereum at low cost by exploiting under-priced
operations. An operation is regarded as under-priced if its gas cost is lower than
what it should be. Actually, two DoS attacks exploiting such operations were dis-
covered in 2016, which repeatedly execute two under-priced operations, namely
EXTCODESIZE [7] and SUICIDE [6], thus resulting in slow transaction processing,
wasted hard drive space, and long synchronization time. More seriously, the con-
fidence of users in Ethereum will be shaken, and consequently the market price
of Ethereum will be impacted [21]. Since each Ethereum node should maintain
the complete copy of blockchain and replay all transactions in history for syn-
chronization, such DoS attacks happened in history will also impact the newly
enrolled nodes. Although Ethereum adjusted the gas costs of operations to de-
fend against such known attacks [7,6], it remains unknown whether or not the
new setting is resistant to unknown attacks and how to properly configure the
gas costs of operations to mitigate DoS attacks.
In this paper, we make the first step to address this challenging issue by first
proposing an emulation-based framework (in Section 4) to automatically measure
the consumptions of computing resources of EVM operations. The framework
consists of the interpretation handler for each EVM operation, the related data
structures and diverse simulated environments in an attempt to explore all pro-
gram paths of those handlers. The experimental result reveals that the latest
setting in Ethereum is still not proper although it can mitigate the known DoS
attacks. From this investigation, we obtain the insight that there may always ex-
ist exploitable under-priced operations if the operation costs are fixed, because
the factors influencing the costs of EVM operations keep changing.
Therefore, we propose a novel adaptive gas cost mechanism (in Section 5),
which will dynamically adjust the costs of EVM operations according to the
number of executions, to defend against known and unknown DoS attacks. This
mechanism punishes the operations leading to abnormal high gas costs if they
are executed much more frequently than before. Consequently, the exponentially
increased gas costs will impede the attackers without unlimited money from
conducting effective DoS attacks. Our experiments in a private blockchain show
that the new mechanism can effectively thwart both known and unknown DoS
attacks and introduce negligible additional gas consumption to benign users.
Moreover, by exploiting Ethereum’s unique feature, we realize our mechanism
through a novel approach in order to make it secure and flexible in terms of pa-
rameter adjustment. More precisely, we develop a specific smart contract and
provide a patch to EVM. After patching the EVM, the developers of Ethereum
can adjust the parameters by sending transactions to that smart contract, and
then the updated EVM can fetch the parameters periodically by reading the
storage of that smart contract. Our new approach leverages the underlying
blockchain technique to make the parameters auditable and untamperable. More-
over, our approach has good deployability because it only needs updating the
EVM once.
In summary, we make the following major contributions:
(1) We propose the first emulation-based measurement framework, which can
automatically estimate the resource consumptions of EVM operations, to assess
whether or not the gas costs in Ethereum are properly configured (Section 4).
(2) We propose a novel adaptive gas cost mechanism, which dynamically adjusts
operation costs according to their execution times, to defend against known and
unknown DoS attacks with negligible impacts on benign users.
(3) We design a new approach to realize our gas cost mechanism by exploit-
ing Ethereum’s smart contract and its underlying bloackchain technique. This
approach makes our mechanism secure, flexible, easy to be deployed.
(4) We conduct experiments in a private blockchain to evaluate our mechanism.
The results show that it can effectively thwart both known and unknown DoS
attacks and introduce negligible additional gas consumption to benign users.
Moreover, the parameters can be dynamically adjusted by authorized users.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
background knowledge. Section 3 presents our analysis of two real DoS attacks
on Ethereum. Section 4 details the measurement framework. We describe the
adaptive gas cost mechanism and its implementation in Section 5 and Section
6, respectively. The experiment results are introduced in Section 7. After sum-
marizing related studies in Section 8, we conclude the paper in Section 9.
2 Background
This section introduces some background knowledge of Ethereum. Besides pro-
viding a cryptocurrency (i.e., Ether), Ethereum supports deploying and running
smart contracts. There are two types of accounts in Ethereum, including exter-
nal owned accounts (EOA) and smart contracts. The major difference between
them is that only smart contracts contain executable bytecode [1]. Ethereum
uses the underlying P2P overlay to deliver transactions among Ethereum nodes.
A transaction refers to the signed data package that stores a message to be sent
from an EOA to another account on the blockchain [1]. A block is a data struc-
ture to store zero or more transactions. Each node runs an Ethereum client that
obeys Ethereum protocol [24]. The consensus in Ethereum is achieved by using
a modified version of GHOST protocol [19], and as the result of the consensus,
every node maintains the same copy of the blockchain. In particular, a newly
joined node should download all blocks (i.e., synchronization) and then run all
historical transactions to reach the same state as the other nodes.
Ethereum can be considered as a state machine where a state is a snap-
shot of the blockchain (e.g., the balances of all accounts, the value of a variable
in a smart contract) and a transaction results in a state transfer. If the tar-
get of a transaction is a smart contract, the smart contract will be executed in
EVM. Since EVM is usually embedded in the Ethereum client, the execution of
smart contracts consumes the computing resources (e.g., CPU, disk, network)
of each node. Consequently, a DoS attack will impact all nodes because each
of them should execute all historical transactions. To prevent abusing comput-
ing resources, Ethereum leverages gas to charge execution fee from transaction
senders. The amount of gas consumption is determined by the executed EVM
operations, and different operations may have different gas costs [24]. In Section
3, we use real attacks to explain how attackers exploit the improper setting of
gas cost to launch DoS attacks at low expense.
3 Analyzing Real DoS Attacks on Ethereum
This section dissects two real DoS attacks exploiting under-priced operations.
3.1 EXTCODESIZE Attack
Approach: The attacker sends lots of transactions to invoke a deployed smart
contract involving many EXTCODESIZE operations, which gets the size of an ac-
count’s code [24]. Such attack forces EXTCODESIZE to be executed roughly 50,000
times per block [7].
Symptom: Clients spend a very long time to process those blocks that contain
the transactions sent from the attacker, and hence the throughput of Ethereum
for processing transactions is decreased.
Cause: EXTCODESIZE has a very low gas cost (i.e., 20 in go-ethereum V 1.3.5),
but it involves expensive operation (i.e., reading information from the disk).
Hence, the execution of a great number of EXTCODESIZE results in busy I/O and
slow transaction processing speed.
Countermeasure: New Ethereum (e.g., go-ethereum V 1.6) increases the gas
cost of EXTCODESIZE to 700 [5] (in the source file gas table.go). Consequently, the
transaction senders have to pay 35 (= 700/20) times more money when using
go-ethereum V 1.6. 700 gas is equal to about 0.000014 Ether (many senders
set the gas price to 0.00000002 Ether at August, 2017), whose value is about
0.0042 USD (1 Ether can be exchanged into about 300 USD at August 13th,
2017 [11]). Although a single operation does not cost much, the accumulative
gas consumption is considerable, because each transaction incurs the execution
of many operations and there are more than 45 million transactions from the
launch of Ethereum to August 13th, 2017 [2].
3.2 SUICIDE Attack
Approach: The attacker creates lots of smart contracts with a loop in their
constructors. In the loop, the SUICIDE operation is executed. According to
Ethereum’s protocol, SUICIDE is used to remove the executed smart contract
from the blockchain and send the remaining Ether to the designated account [24].
For each generated smart contract, the transaction for creating it triggers its con-
structor, and hence lots of SUICIDE whose target accounts do not exist, will be
executed. Note that a nonexistent account does not need to be stored in the
Ethereum state tree [6], which represents the state of the blockchain.
Symptom: About 19 million accounts were created by the attack, which con-
sume considerable disk space, and thus the synchronization and transaction pro-
cessing are slowed down.
Cause: If the target account does not exist, a SUICIDE operation will turn it
into existent, which will be stored in the Ethereum state tree [6]. However, the
gas cost of SUICIDE is zero. Therefore, an attacker creates a huge number of
accounts by executing SUICIDE repeatedly at very low cost.
Countermeasure: New Ethereum increases the gas cost of SUICIDE to 5,000
and additional 25,000 if it creates a new account [5] (in the source file gas table.go).
Moreover, new clients can delete the zombie accounts created by the attack.
3.3 Remarks
From the above analysis, we learn that to exploit the under-priced operations for
launching DoS attacks, the attacker has to first find or prepare a smart contract
containing the under-priced operations, and then cause such operations to be
executed lots of times by sending transactions to the smart contract. Moreover,
since the gas cost for sending a transaction is high (e.g., at least 21,000 in
go-ethereum V 1.6), the attacker usually lets each transaction trigger multiple
executions of the under-priced operations. To defend against such DoS attacks,
we should either properly set the costs of EVM operations (i.e., remove under-
priced operations) or force the attacker to pay a lot of money for executing the
under-priced operations many times.
In Section 4, we propose a novel emulation-based measurement framework to
assess whether or not the latest gas cost setting is proper. Unfortunately, we find
that the latest setting still has exploitable under-priced operations, and it is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to eliminate all under-priced operations if the operation
costs are fixed, because the factors influencing the cost of each EVM operation
keep changing. Therefore, we explore an alternative approach by proposing a
novel adaptive gas cost mechanism in Section 5.
4 Emulation-based Measurement Framework
Although Ethereum has changed the gas costs of some under-priced operations
to defend against the known DoS attacks [7,6], little is known whether or not
the latest gas cost setting is immune to DoS attacks exploiting under-priced
operations. To address this issue, the resource consumption of each EVM oper-
ation should be measured. However, it is non-trivial to measure the computing
resources consumed by a single EVM operation because the execution of a smart
contract involves not only many EVM operations but also various utility func-
tions for supporting the execution.
To tackle this problem, we propose a novel emulation-based measurement
framework. More precisely, by exploiting EVM’s architecture, we extract the
interpretation handler for each operation (e.g., the opAdd() function is responsi-
ble for executing the addition operation), the related data structures (e.g., stack,
memory, storage) from the EVM implementation, and prepare an emulated en-
vironment, which consists of the Go compiler, runtime libraries (e.g., the bigInt
library to handle large integers) and the state of the blockchain (e.g., the bal-
ance of an account), for executing the operation. Then, we run the interpretation
handler in the emulated environment millions of times, because a single run is
too short to conduct the measurement, and record the execution time. Note
that the current implementation of our framework can automatically measure
the CPU consumption in terms of the execution time, and we will support the
measurement of other resources in future work.
There is a challenge in preparing the emulated environment. In particular,
since a handler may have various execution paths with different resource con-
sumption, we need to explore all execution paths for measuring the handler’s
resource consumption. The example in Fig .1 shows that the handler for execut-
ing SUICIDE consists of an expensive path (Line 15, CreateStateObject() allocates
disk space to store accounts) if the target account is nonexistent since it will be-
come existent after executing SUICIDE and a cheap path (Line 16) if the target is
existent. To address this challenge, we run the handler millions of times, provid-
ing with different inputs and proper runtime environment. If the operation ma-
nipulates the stack/memory/storage, we synthesize the stack/memory/storage
with random length and generates random numbers as their items. If the opera-
tion needs the information from EVM (e.g., block number, gas price, gas limit)
or the smart contract (e.g., code length, input to the contract, the address of the
contract), we prepare an EVM/smart contract object with randomly generated
fields. If the operation needs to interact with another account, we take into ac-
count the following three situations. First, if the target account is nonexistent,
no special preparation is needed. Second, if the target account is an EOA, we
generate one using the command provided by Etheruem’s client. Third, if the
target account is a smart contract, we develop and deploy one in the private
chain, whose code is a RETURN since we measure the resources consumed by the
invocation, rather than the execution of the invoked smart contract.
1 func opSuicide(contract *Contract, stack *stack, …){ 
2   balance := env.Db().GetBalance(contract) 
3   env.Db().AddBalance(stack.pop(), balance) 
4 env.Db().Delete(contract) 
5 } 
6 func (self *StateDB) AddBalance(addr common.Address, amount *big.Int) { 
7   stateObject := self.GetOrNewStateObject(addr) 
8 if stateObject != nil { 
9 stateObject.AddBalance(amount) 
10   } 
11 } 
12  func (self *StateDB) GetOrNewStateObject(addr common.Address) *StateObject { 
13 stateObject := self.GetStateObject(addr) 
14 if stateObject == nil || stateObject.deleted { 
15  stateObject = self.CreateStateObject(addr) //a heavy path 
16  }//else..., a cheap path 
17 return stateObject 
18 } 
Fig. 1. An expensive path and a cheap path of opSuicide
We classify all EVM operations into five categories in terms of the data
structures on which they operate. The operations in the first category do not
manipulate any data structures (e.g., JUMPDEST). The operations in the second
category handle the stack (e.g., ADD). The operations in the third category get
access to the specific fields related to blockchain (e.g., ORIGIN). The fourth cate-
gory of operations manipulates the memory (e.g., MSTORE). The operations in the
fifth category manipulate the storage (e.g., SLOAD). Note that in Ethereum mem-
ory is an infinitely expandable byte-array that resets after computation ends,
while storage is a long-term key/value store that persists for the long term [19].
Fig. 2 (the y-axis is on a log scale) presents the CPU consumptions of some
EVM operations running 50 million times from all the five categories. Experi-
ments are conducted on a desktop equipped with an Intel i3-4160 CPU and 8GB
memory. The number on top of each box is the operation’s gas cost according to
Ethereum’s yellow paper [24]. All measurements repeat 100 times. JUMPDEST is
the destination of a jump (e.g., JUMP, JUMPI) operation, which belongs to the first
category. ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV, SDIV, MOD, SMOD, ADDMOD, MULMOD are arithmetic
operations. NOT and XOR are bitwise operations. ISZERO and LT are comparison
operations. These operations belong the second category. ORIGIN is the repre-
sentative of the third category which reads a field of the block’s head. MSTORE
and SHA3 belong to the fourth category. MSTORE writes a word to memory while
SHA3 can operate multiple items in memory. In particular, SHA3 hashes the data
in memory and its gas cost is the summation of basic gas (i.e., 30) with the
gas for operating memory. The more memory it reads, the more gas it requires.
EXP is a special arithmetic operation whose gas cost is the summation of basic
gas (i.e., 10) with the remaining part which is determined by the bit length of
the exponent. In other words, the gas cost of EXP becomes high if it has a large
exponent. Fig. 2 shows that EXP costs considerable CPU resources. SLOAD loads
an item from the storage.
The results show that the latest gas costs are not proportional to the con-
sumptions of CPU resources. For example, DIV (division) has the same gas cost
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Fig. 2. Time consumptions of EVM operations
of SDIV (signed division), but the execution time needed by DIV is about 23%
(10.4s/45s) of that needed by SDIV. We find the reason by investigating the
source code of handlers for DIV and SDIV, which is listed in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 lists
the source code (from go-ethereum V 1.6) of division (function opDiv(), Line 10)
and signed division (function opSdiv(), Line 26), respectively, whose gas costs
are equivalent. For the ease of presentation, we simplify the source code. We can
see that the functions opDiv() and opSdiv() consist of stack operations (e.g.,
stack.pop()) and math computations (e.g. x.And()) provided by the bigInt li-
brary. Further experiments reveal that math computations (in red color) take
up most of the execution time. We also find that the execution of a division
operation needs 4 math computations (i.e., 1 Div, 1 And, 1 Sub and 1 Exp) at
most whereas the execution of a signed division needs 11 (i.e., 3 Sub, 3 Exp, 2
Abs, 1 Mul, 1 Div and 1 And) at most. Hence, SDIV is more resource-consuming
than DIV. Consequently, some operations (e.g., EXP, SHA3, as shown in Fig. 2)
may be under-priced and thus could be exploited by DoS attacks.
1 func BigPow(a, b int64) { 
2 r := big.NewInt(a) 
3 return r.Exp(r, big.NewInt(b), nil) 
4 } 
5 tt256 = BigPow(2, 256) 
6 tt256m1 = new(big.Int).Sub(tt256, big.NewInt(1)) 
7  func U256(x *big.Int){ 
8   return x.And(x, tt256m1) 
9  } 
10 func opDiv(stack *Stack){ 
11 x, y := stack.pop(), stack.pop() 
12   if y.Sign() != 0 { 
13   stack.push(math.U256(x.Div(x, y))) 
14   } else { 
15 stack.push(new(big.Int)) 
18 tt255 = BigPow(2, 255) 
19 func S256(x *big.Int) { 
20 if x.Cmp(tt255) < 0 { 
21  return x 
22 } else { 
23 return new(big.Int).Sub(x, tt256) 
24   } 
25 } 
26 func opSdiv(stack *Stack) { 
27 x, y := math.S256(stack.pop()), math.S256(stack.pop()) 
28 If y.Sign() == 0 { 
29  stack.push(new(big.Int)) 
30 } else { 
31 if evm.interpreter.intPool.get().Mul(x, y).Sign() < 0 { 
32 n.SetInt64(-1)
33 } else { 
34 n.SetInt64(1)
35   } 
36   res := x.Div(x.Abs(x), y.Abs(y)) 
37   res.Mul(res, n) 
38   stack.push(math.U256(res)) 
39 } 
40 } 
16   } 
17 } 
Fig. 3. EVM source code for executing DIV and SDIV
5 Adaptive Gas Cost Mechanism
The investigation in Section 4 shows that it is not easy to properly assign gas
costs to EVM operations. Hence, we propose a novel adaptive gas cost mechanism
for defending against DoS attacks.
5.1 Threat Model
We assume that the attacker can discover under-priced operations (if any) and
then launch the attack by invoking either existing smart contracts or new smart
contracts crafted by the attacker. Moreover, the attacker is rational and does
not have unlimited money for launching attacks. In this case, she will give up
the attack if her money cannot force the under-priced operations to be executed
for lots of times. Moreover, she will not send a transaction that can execute the
under-priced operations only a few times because sending a transaction is not
cheap (i.e., gas cost is 21,000). Last but not least, normal users will not accept
a gas cost mechanism that charges much money from them.
5.2 Adaptive Adjustment of Gas Costs
Exploiting the observation in Section 3.3 that a successful DoS attack has to
trigger lots of executions of under-priced operations, we propose a new mech-
anism that increases the gas cost of an operation dynamically if it has been
executed much more frequently than before. More precisely, we collect the ex-
ecution traces (i.e., a sequence of executed operations) of normal transactions,
and model the execution frequency of each EVM operation. Then, for every new
transaction, we set a basic gas cost for each operation by default, and count the
number of executions of each operation. If the number of an operation is larger
than a threshold, its gas cost will be increased. The advantage of our mechanism
is that it does not need to know which operations are under-priced. Instead,
it punishes the over-frequent EVM operation through the increased gas cost.
Hence, it can defend against known and unknown DoS attacks.
We define a threshold µi for the operation i as shown in Eqn. (1). The oper-
ation i that has been executed for more than µi in one transaction is regarded
as over-frequent, and its gas cost will be increased. avei and stdi stand for the
average and the standard deviation of the number of executing operation i, re-
spectively. Section 6.1 details how to compute them. base count is an integer
used to prevent increasing the gas cost of an infrequently-executed operation
too fast. m is a parameter for adjusting the threshold.
µi = max{base count, avei +m× stdi} (1)
The gas cost of an EVM operation is dynamically adjusted according to
Eqn. (2), where counti is the number of executions of operation i, base gasi
is the default gas cost of i. We uses an exponential function to punish over-
frequent operations with accelerating increments in gas costs. Its base (i.e. α > 1)
determines the speed of increasing the gas cost. We let the exponent as countiµi −1
that includes µi for taking into account the operation’s normal frequency. Since
our mechanism will assign an operation a very high gas cost if it has been
executed much more times in a transaction than before, it deters an attacker from
executing an under-priced operation many times by one transaction. Moreover,
our mechanism avoids charging much more gas from benign senders by setting
proper parameters. We evaluate the effects of various parameters in Section
7.3. gasi is restored to base gasi for a new transaction, and hence the attacker
cannot affect the initial operation costs of benign transactions. Fig. 4 shows the
curves of Eqn. (2) with various parameters, indicating that µi and α can affect
the point from where to increase gas cost and the speed to increase gas cost,
respectively. We have several observations. First, µi determines the point from
where gasi should be increased. Moreover, α determines the increasing speed of
gasi. Typically, gasi should be increased with the increase of execution number
counti, and hence α should be larger than 1.
gasi =
{
base gasi, if counti ≤ µi
base gasi + α
counti
µi
−1
, if counti > µi
(2)
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Fig. 4. Curves of Eqn. (2), base gasi = 3
Section 5.3 will describe the way to adjust the parameters in Eqn. (1) and
Eqn. (2), and we will try other functions (e.g., linear, polynomial) in Eqn. (2)
in future work.
5.3 Dynamic Parameter Configuration
Since Ethereum and its smart contracts evolve over time, the parameters should
be changed accordingly. Therefore, we need an approach for dynamic parameter
configuration. This approach should meet the following requirements. First, the
parameter configuration should be auditable by any users of Ethereum. Second,
the parameter configuration should be secure so that attackers cannot modify the
parameters. Third, the approach should not need to frequently update Ethereum
client due to the risk of hard fork.
Exploiting Ethereum’s unique feature, we propose a novel approach for real-
izing dynamic parameter configuration by developing a specific smart contract
and providing a patch to EVM. The developers of Ethereum can adjust the
parameters by sending transactions carrying new parameters to that smart con-
tract. They can adjust a variable, block number, in the smart contract, which is
used to determine when the new setting takes effect. Then, the patched EVM can
fetch the parameters periodically by reading the storage of that smart contract.
The period (measured by blocks) of querying new parameters should be shorter
than the difference between the variable, block number, in the smart contract
and the block number when setting the new parameters so that all clients can
get the newest setting before the block when the setting takes effect.
Our new approach leverages the underlying blockchain technique to make
the parameters auditable and untamperable. Note that no one can change the
setting of gas costs by just subverting her EVM. Moreover, the smart contract
for updating parameters cannot be tampered by attackers who do not have
more than 50% computing power because the contract itself will be validated in
the process of consensus. The change of parameters will be auditable because
all transactions are publicly available in the blockchain. Last but not least the
Ethereum client (i.e., its EVM) should only be updated once for adopting our
new gas cost mechanism. After that, they do not need to be updated again for
using the new parameters.
6 Implementation
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Fig. 5. Overview of our implementation.
The implementation of our new mechanism consists of four parts (Fig. 5).
The first part collects execution traces of smart contracts and computes avei and
stdi. Part 2 is the smart contract storing the parameters that can be updated by
Ethereum developers. Part 3 and 4 describe the patch to EVM, including how
to fetch new parameters and how to apply them, respectively.
6.1 Computing avei and stdi
To compute avei and stdi, we first leverage EVM’s built-in tracing ability to
record all execution traces. We define a sliding window, and use all traces within
that window for computing avei and stdi. Fig 6 shows avei and stdi of PUSH1
with different window sizes (i.e., 100, 1,000 and 10,000) in the first 16,000 exe-
cution traces since the launch of Ethereum. We assume that these traces were
triggered by benign transactions since no known attacks were discovered in them.
Please note that PUSH1 is the most frequent operation, which pushes one byte
on stack.
The x-axis gives the window index and for example, a point (x, y) on the
red line of Fig 6(a) indicates that avei of PUSH1 of the traces within the window
[x + 1, x + 10, 000] is y. We can see that the avei of PUSH1 increases as time
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Fig. 6. Average number and standard deviation of the executions of PUSH1.
goes on, indicating that smart contracts become more complicated than before.
Second, as we expected, the larger the window is, the more stable avei and stdi
will be. Moreover, it is difficult for an attacker to tamper avei and stdi by filling
the large window with crafted transactions. Our approach allows developers to
adjust the window size.
6.2 Smart contract
We implement a smart contract (as shown in Fig. 7) to store parameters which
allows the contract’s creator to update parameters through executing transac-
tions, and then we deploy it on our private blockchain. For ease of presentation,
we omit the details of updating avei and stdi of each operation i, which is the
same as the updating the other parameters (e.g., m). Line 2 declares several
global variables which store in the storage. address (Line 3) is a built-in variable
type of Ethereum which can only be used for storing account address. N is the
time interval of two consecutive queries, and delta is a small number that we
consider all clients can get the new setting in the time period of N +delta (Line
13). The function AdaptiveGas() is the construct function that will be executed
during the creation of the smart contract. Please note that the arguments of
AdaptiveGas() are also given in the transaction for contract creation.
1 contract AdaptiveGas { 
2   uint base_count, m, alpha, blk_num, N, delta; 
3    address creator; //owner 
4    function AdaptiveGas(uint init_base_count, uint init_m, uint init_alpha, 
uint init_blk_num, uint default_N, uint default_delta){ 
5  base_count = init_base_count; m = init_m;  
6 alpha = init_alpha; blk_num = init_blk_num; 
7 N = default_N; delta = default_delta; 
8 creator = msg.sender; //set contract owner 
9   } 
10 function UpdateSetting(uint new_base_count, uint new_m, 
uint new_alpha, uint new_blk_num){  
11 require(msg.sender == creator); //authentication 
12  if (new_blk_num < block.number + N + delta) 
13  new_blk_num = block.number + N + delta;  
14 base_count = new_base_count; m = new_m; 
15 alpha = new_alpha; blk_num = new_blk_num; 
16 } 
17 } 
1 var contract = common.HexToAddress(“ac43…”) 
2  base_count = evm.StateDB.GetState(contract, 0) 
3  m = evm.StateDB.GetState(contract, 1) 
4  alpha = evm.StateDB.GetState(contract, 2) 
5  blk_num = evm.StateDB.GetState(contract, 3) 
Fig. 7. The smart contract for updating the setting of parameters
Besides setting the default parameters in AdaptiveGas() (Lines 5-7), we
record the contract owner (Line 8), ensuring that only the owner can change
parameters setting (Line 11). The function UpdateSetting() accepts the new set-
ting of parameters from transaction senders. Lines 12, 13 ensure that the time
period (N + delta) is enough for all clients to check the update. Please note
that msg.sender and block.number are two built-in properties of Ethereum that
get the address of transaction sender and the number of block which contains
the transaction, respectively. Please note that the transaction fees for sending
the transactions to adjust paramters are negligible for Ethereum official society
because a single transaction does not cost much (always less than 1 USD [2])
and parameters do not need to adjust very frequently.
6.3 Querying new parameters
Fig. 8 shows the code snippet (simplified for presentation) for an EVM to get
the new setting of parameters. Since each Ethereum node keeps a complete copy
of blockchain, their EVMs can get the values of all storage variables given the
address of the smart contract by accessing the local copy of blockchain. It is more
efficient than an intuitive approach that fetches the new parameters by sending
a transaction to the smart contract, because the latter will add transactions to
the blockchain periodically and cause additional fee for sending transactions.
Our approach can avoid these issues. Line 1 specifies the address (i.e., ac43...)
of the contract, which is known because the contract is developed and deployed
by us. Then, Lines 2-5 obtain individual parameters by directly accessing (i.e.,
invoking the internal function evm.StateDB.GetState() of EVM) the storage of
the contract. The integers 0, 1, etc. give the locations of parameters stored in
the storage. Finally, those parameters are used for computing gas costs.
1 contract AdaptiveGas { 
2   uint base_count, m, alpha, blk_num, N, delta; 
3    address creator; //owner 
4    function AdaptiveGas(uint init_base_count, uint init_m, uint init_alpha, 
uint init_blk_num, uint default_N, uint default_delta){ 
5  base_count = init_base_count; m = init_m;  
6 alpha = init_alpha; blk_num = init_blk_num; 
7 N = default_N; delta = default_delta; 
8 creator = msg.sender; //set contract owner 
9   } 
10 function UpdateSetting(uint new_base_count, uint new_m, 
uint new_alpha, uint new_blk_num){  
11 require(msg.sender == creator); //authentication 
12  if (new_blk_num < block.number + N + delta) 
13  new_blk_num = block.number + N + delta;  
14 base_count = new_base_count; m = new_m; 
15 alpha = new_alpha; blk_num = new_blk_num; 
16 } 
17 } 
1 var contract = common.HexToAddress(“ac43…”) 
2  base_count = evm.StateDB.GetState(contract, 0) 
3  m = evm.StateDB.GetState(contract, 1) 
4  alpha = evm.StateDB.GetState(contract, 2) 
5  blk_num = evm.StateDB.GetState(contract, 3) 
Fig. 8. Modifications of EVM to obtain new parameters.
6.4 Applying new parameters
We modify go-ethereum V 1.3.5 to realize our mechanism because it has several
known under-priced operations, and we compare the original V 1.3.5 with the
patched one in Section 7.1. When Ethereum starts, we load the setting of pa-
rameters (e.g., avei, stdi, m, α) in the entry function (i.e., the main() function
in \cmd\geth\main.go). Please note that the default gas cost of each operation
(i.e., base gasi) is the same as that in go-ethereum V 1.3.5. We replace the code
in the function CalculateGasAndSize() in \core\vm\vm.go, which is responsi-
ble for computing the gas consumption of individual operation, with our code
to calculate gas cost and increase the execution number of the EVM operation
by one. In other words, Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (2) are implemented in Calculate-
GasAndSize(). The number of executions will be reset before the execution of
each transaction, which is implemented in the function ApplyTransaction() in
\core\state processor.go. To reduce the runtime overhead, we cache the gas costs
of operations, which have already been computed, in main memory.
7 Evaluation
This section answers the following questions through experiments.
RQ1: Can our mechanism thwart known and unknown DoS attacks effectively?
RQ2: How much additional gas will be charged from benign users by our mech-
anism?
RQ3: What are the effects of parameters?
All experiments are conducted in a private Ethereum blockchain on a desktop
equipped with an Intel Xeon E312 processor and 8GB memory. Our private
blockchain has one miner and is isolated with the public Ethereum blockchain
and other testing blockchains. We create an account to hold the rewards from
mining. We guarantee that the account has enough money to send transactions
by setting a low mining difficulty. Every block also has a gas limit, dubbed
BGL (Block Gas Limit), which restricts the size of a block (i.e., the number
of transactions contained in the block). The BGL is set as 4 million, which is
comparable with that in the public chain at present. We let the TGL be equal to
the BGL, in order to see how many under-priced operations can be executed by
a single transaction using the original gas cost mechanism and our mechanism,
respectively. The parameters base count, m and α in Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (2) are
set to 5, 3 and 2 by default, respectively. We evaluate our mechanism under
different settings in Section 7.3.
7.1 Experiments with DoS Attacks
We simulate the two real attacks [7,6] in our private blockchain. To launch
the EXTCODESIZE attack, we develop a smart contract with a public function
extAttack() that can be called by our account. extAttack() has a loop where
we use inline assembly to execute EXTCODESIZE directly. The SUICIDE attack is
launched in a more intricate way since a smart contract will be removed (i.e.,
cannot get accessed) by executing SUICIDE. The SUICIDE attack exploits the
feature of Ethereum: a smart contract will not be removed before the completion
of the transaction that triggers the SUICIDE operation. Consequently, we create
a smart contract whose constructor invokes SUICIDE in a loop. When creating
the contract, the corresponding transaction executes SUICIDE repeatedly. We
also use the built-in tracing ability of EVM to record the execution traces of
smart contracts as well as the gas consumption of each operation.
The experimental results reveal that the two attacks execute 92,494 and
11,335 times of EXTCODESIZE and SUICIDE, respectively, in one transaction using
the original (i.e., go-ethereum V 1.3.5) gas cost mechanism. By contrast, the two
attacks only execute 99 and 81 times of EXTCODESIZE and SUICIDE, respectively,
with the same cost (i.e., 4 million gas) after our mechanism is applied. Fig. 10(a)
(y-axis is on a log scale) and Fig. 10(b) shows the gas cost of each operation in
descending order after the attacks when our mechanism used. Note that these
two figures do not include all operations due to the page limit. We can see
that the gas costs of the two under-priced operations become very expensive
(i.e., 457,119 and 37,640 respectively) after attacks. We also find some other
expensive operations (e.g., CALLDATALOAD, CALL) because they are also in the
loop, resulting in over-frequent executions than before. Fig. 9 demonstrates that
the execution frequencies of different operations vary. Moreover, the two under-
priced operations (i.e., EXTCODESIZE and SUCIDE) exploited by real attacks are
rarely executed by benign users.
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Fig. 11. Execution numbers of under-priced operations
To evaluate our approach against unknown DoS attacks, we synthesize three
attacks by executing three under-priced operations (i.e., EXTCODECOPY, SLOAD
and BALANCE) in a loop, respectively, which are similar to the EXTCODESIZE
attack. Note that go-ethereum V 1.3.5 will be affected by the DoS attacks ex-
ploiting these operations whereas the latest version of Ethereum has increased
their gas costs. Fig. 11 demonstrates that our method reduces the number of ex-
ecutions of under-priced operations by several orders of magnitude. Therefore,
the answer to RQ1 is:
Our gas cost mechanism can effectively thwart known and unknown DoS attacks.
7.2 Experiments with Normal Transactions
To evaluate how much additional gas will be charged from normal users by our
mechanism, we first randomly select 10 smart contracts and then replay their
transactions in the original go-ethereum V 1.3.5 and the updated go-ethereum
V 1.3.5 with our gas cost mechanism, respectively. 84 transactions in total are
replayed, and 15 transactions (2 to one contract and the other 13 to another
contract) out of them incur additional gas by our mechanism. The total gas
consumed by 84 transactions under the original gas cost setting is 2,441,340,
and the total additional gas incurred by our mechanism is 444. Therefore, the
percentage of additional gas charged from benign users is about 0.018%.
As a case study, we detail the experiment with one smart contract. More pre-
cisely, the smart contract is deployed at 0x61F9d1cE56aC1623FeD4e949D7D4202
51fef0896. We compile the source and deploy the smart contract in the private
blockchain. There are 37 transactions to that smart contract in total until April
29, 2017. We do not replay the transaction for contract creation since it does
not trigger the execution of any public functions provided by the smart contract,
nor the 4 transactions with internal transactions because our private blockchain
is isolated from other accounts. Note that an internal transaction is not a real
transaction and will not be stored in the blockchain. Instead, it is made by
calling (via CALL, CALLCODE, DELEGATECALL etc.) an account from a smart con-
tract. We also skip the transaction running out of gas, and hence we replay 31
(37− 1− 4− 1) transactions.
The results show that 18 out of 31 transactions consume the same amount
of gas under our mechanism and the original mechanism. The total increment
in gas consumption of the other 13 transactions incurred by our mechanism
is 130, and the largest increment in gas consumption of one transaction is 10.
Please note that the total gas consumption of the 31 transactions under original
mechanism is 1,357,654. That is, the increment in gas consumption due to our
mechanism is negligible (i.e., 0.01%). Hence, the answer to RQ2 is:
Our gas cost mechanism charges negligible additional gas from benign users.
7.3 Different Parameter Settings
We evaluate our mechanism under three different settings as listed in Table 1.
For example, “3(5/1.2)” means that in setting 3, m and α are set to 5 and
1.2, respectively. Please note that the setting 2 is the default setting. Table 1
also presents the execution numbers of under-priced operations and the highest
gas costs of them. For example, “48/1,026,690” in row 2, column 2 indicates
EXTCODECOPY executes 48 times under setting 1 and the gas cost of the 48th
EXTCODECOPY is 1,026,690. Please note that the gas cost of an operation keeps
increasing if its execution number exceeds µi (Eqn. (2)).
Table 1. Execution numbers (before /) and the highest gas costs (after /) of under-
priced operations under different settings
setting BALANCE EXTCODECOPY EXTCODESIZE SLOAD SUICIDE
1(1/5) 48/1,026,387 48/1,026,690 48/1,026,687 48/1,026,187 22/237
2(3/2) 99/456,819 99/457,122 99/457,119 99/456,619 81/37,640
3(5/1.2) 329/135,590 328/131,052 328/131,049 329/135,390 289/31,440
The experimental results demonstrate that our approach is sensitive to DoS
attacks by setting a small m and a large α. The setting 1 detects attacks
quicker (i.e., the execution numbers of under-priced operations are the lowest)
than the other two settings. For example, the EXTCODESIZE attack executes 48
EXTCODESIZE, and its gas cost reaches 1,026,187 under the setting 1 whereas
the attack executes 328 EXTCODESIZE and the gas cost of EXTCODESIZE reaches
131,049 under the setting 3. The results are as expected since the threshold µi
depends on m and α determines the speed of increasing gas costs.
One may feel strange that SUICIDE presents different trend with the other
attacks under different settings. For example, the gas cost of SUICIDE under the
setting 2 is larger than that under the other two settings, whereas the gas costs
of the other four under-priced operations under the setting 1 reach the largest
value. The reason is that SUICIDE is not the most expensive operation during
attack (as shown in Fig. 10(b)), and thus the execution number of SUICIDE is
influenced by the gas consumption of other expensive operations. Fig. 12 shows
the increment in gas consumption of applying 31 transactions to the smart con-
tract at 0x61F9d1cE56aC1623FeD4e949D7D420251fef0896 under three different
settings. The x-axis specifies transactions in short, e.g., 3d1b is the first two
bytes of a transaction hash which is 32 bytes in length. The results reveal that
a setting that is more sensitive to DoS attacks may charge more execution fee
from benign users.
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Fig. 12. Additional gas consumption of 31 transactions under three different settings
We also evaluate whether our mechanism can defend against DoS attacks ex-
ploiting the five under-priced operations under the default setting with different
window sizes. We compute avei and stdi of each operation i for different win-
dows sizes, including 100, 500, 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000. We use the first 16,000
transactions since the lanuch of Ethereum for experiments, which do not include
attacks. The attacks exploiting the five under-priced operations are conducted
in our private chain for this experiment.
Fig .13 presents the execution numbers of SLOAD with different window sizes
(the experiments of other four under-priced operations produce similar results).
It shows that that our method is effective using the parameters computed from all
window sizes because the under-priced operation executes more than the thresh-
old µi at any window sizes and hence its gas cost increases during attacks. More
precisely, the orginal gas cost method allows SLOAD to execute nearly 100,000
times (Fig. 11) whereas our method reduces this number significantly.
We assume all transaction in the windows for computing parameters are be-
nign. Attackers may want to place crafted transactions into the windows to affect
the process of computing avei and stdi for the sake of evading the detection.
8000 
" 
一－ ～运＝＝ 三
＝主主＝ ＝＝ 
至＝ = == 
f 111 11 －…．－ －
f
” 三：� ：二－ － － 
I : (t:: : · ＝ －． ． ＝ 
I 恒 .I: -－ 、I: '.;ar- : : = I Ir= 
I ': � :: 
自 ：� 王： － � 
· ＝ 罩’ ＝
I • :: ,;;. 
I 11 � !"i � _ 雹= = • - = 
I I 二 : :: � 
I • : a i -一－ －
. .  � ! 二 � i� � � • • • - -:• • � = � I= = : ! i � i � � ! ��I i� 
; : � E 主：
I - 二 E 二 ＝• = 二 \: 二
I �� ＼： : :  
I - 二辈 ，，二三
I � � " : I ;•• : ． 二： f ：… 三 I : 二 － t : : ·=; ： ‘ ： ： I : · ： ‘ ： 1 ’呵
I : 喧 ： 二主· ＝ ‘ ： E 主
I ： 喧： ： � ， 二 唱 ： : '; • ． ＝ 坠 幽： : = 
主 I I ： 哇”： ： i ＝三 I • : It " : : ． ； ＝ 岳 ’ 二 ，． － · · ＝ · 
I : It 二- - I : I ， ． ＝ ． ； I : I I -
I I t - I -
I 
I ; 雪 • : ；豆、
I : It I : : :, : 
？ ， 至 号 I � �� � I fr � It I : :: · ． 二 t I ＝ 雪： : ;,L 
: : I • : � : 1:  
--
- � I ： 三＝二 1
::. I I 二 哇 ’ 三 ： : : - :: I i 豆 ： : i :\ : I ii i ii · ＝ － － · 莘 ．·飞后； i • · 立 二 •: I：，＇飞 : : : : ：二
.. ！三： ·= -= ;.
曲‘二－ 三 •••• 2 乓： 兰 I � 二三 : ·= •= : : : : : : : 
f: i尊重： I 号 ; \ : ; f \ i ：� f i t 王：：；1 � .... 喜＝ Iii:胃，L 二：＝�础.二 － : I : : I ·啤 ＝＝ ＝ IC • - 哇 三 二二三 挎 .�－＇！正 二三：丁 ’「：：1··· : 二 ’ 俨 E � l ！；二＝：言 ： � : ;; 飞到 三 唱z �.喝川·· � � � ; ；二三 �·三；二
事圃” 事专• � � eli .i 岳的J’� 万 � u�： f �� ! � = • • ! = ; i 三 = = � = � r = 卜 · ￥ ζ 飞五．，．··唰” : a 4f: : ,, :• : � ！�•： I ．·叫＝ = = - 主＝ : = : ：习＝
主三 ,-: j•i三辜！号？！斗李二？；二．主 ； 1司 J ' : J t·� i9 -::£ ：二 Ill 1�1 I U" l二 V 牵言：乡E � : = : 三：二：：笔言产 雪 [= E r� .： “y i飞J ,Lt T仨 �！ z号：三 三 : 
5 各 � 三 • � �；二二七：专 注：；三兽品... 台’ζ ；军三二 i ＝��－� i' � 
.，��＼ � 二 ;, �｛ 飞： ‘ ￥ 毛 言 �－ �� �� 坐飞� t？飞芸 芸 言 �� 三 3亨:: 罩 ;: � -: -C!: : : ::; = i : - －－予，.；： 音 ：2== l ： 三 言 :::: ?i• :,,.; : 1t.;: ::: :: :; ＝ ＝ 主 ＝？ 辛 三 ＝ ＝ - ,;;: == = 
云 -:f''i: 三 三
= .. －� 
1 
1 
1 
．．．．．．．．． 
．．．．．．．．． 
．．．．．．．．． 
．．．．．．．．． 
．．．．．．．．． 
．．．．．．．．． 
．．．．．．．．． 
．．．．．．．．． 
．．．．．．．．． 
ize 
ize 
ize 
ize 
ize 
wn 
wn 
wn 
wn 
wn 
＂，，，』 III I I ，，，』 111111
．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 
．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 
7000 
6000 
主
．·．··电：
主 ； �·二
写在三 : � :
曲，… ..,, ......叫f
: ！�： I ， · ．
…，.＿ - I - -二 一 ？ 
i 雪� 一一一 ’ 主畏 � E ，ι I 二，ι产 .• ..,,,:;: I .·�－；，＃”、.... "E�－＝··＝ .·一’咽 ,j'§ ��－�� ！！·� .. • ：毛主 二... : ... ： ；二＿！古�· : ·��： 王 垂主 ·飞‘φ挡在� .l. ; f主二在工’二’ : -: ;::'!'.. 歹2 ·－· ’ ·．··由 ·飞·－、宅 4 ;; ·-·= = 
芋 1；毛 f j乞’：.�， �1：�三 L;; 主二：；二字 i i I 拉拉Z �� \1 ＂，•号子；二； 二亏：：� Fr � 二
、 亏 二！－1 tJ 二�� v. ��｝ 注’ ·
 
－·，－ 
[1" －
’... .. 
: I＝’．
：．．翩毯
卫怦： I 
I l 斗飞 1J I 
伞 ， ，.，. I: � 户， － 、
·幅巨 ：三 I I f :: 
主 I I � �� 
兰 ． 『a, .l - -～ 一 － ．－
t哇哇 ·�＝运 ：三
崎飞飞l"t ：－：.�·�，.－； － � ）� � 二号 ：＝ ．蝠，•＇：； 乞 ．··雪， 111- !:: i' ::=.-! :_: _ 
-··:t-l r乙」 ·r 飞 F豆j i��J 三 苟延 宅－·十 二 · 一一 － - -- - . -＝’誓’； •• .. :: ••• - = 辛辛俨 ＝ ， 电 T仨 ， ； 剧；�.�！ t：，，户写 材 带 ν
墨
ξ 
－句＝． －可·
.材主
I :It• � －． 事斗E
J’ 句····�
．·’ ， z二． 
－－－
z －2·
－－
2·
·二
JJ·－ －－ 主
主
币1·－J··w
民 苔 ’ －－ － e U
二
宋先
辛
苦
，·······E
＆
「＝’·
－＝＝
t．‘＝二
、P
’
画
，！
2·Ez
－ － － 一、
t ·
酒
EC
－－＝ ＝－z－
1
．，－J
·『 － －
P、，－－－－，
·’’
4·EE  
．
4 咱巳
＝＝＝＝
＝ ＝－ E 吨 － 1
1 － Y
E－ －
4 、
＝
RI
－ －『
d
』＝－
司· －＝＝
＝
· · ·
7
4，，·
～－
a －E ·
E ·－ －
pdy
－－ 
． 
5000 
4000 
2000 
1000 
3000 
问。
」ωD
c 
c 。23υω
× ω 
16000 12000 8000 4000 
ex n ow n 
Fig. 13. Execution numbers of SLOAD with different window sizes
To make our approach more robust, we suggest analysts to set a relatively large
window size (e.g., 10,000) that consists of many transactions. In another words,
a large window size raises the difficulty for attackers to fill the window with
crafted transactions and tamper parameters. Besides, after detecting an attack-
ing transaction, we can filter out the attacking transactions in the windows by
matching the transaction senders, attached data (specifying which function to
call and providing augments) of transactions, the execution traces of contracts
etc.
Hence, the answer to RQ3 is:
The experimental result show that DoS attacks can be detected quickly and neg-
ligible additional gas is introduced to benign users under different parameter
settings. Our mechanism allows developers to easily adjust parameters with the
evolving of Ethereum.
8 Related Work
DoS attacks have posed a severe threat to the Internet[17,25] and various systems[10,14]
and services [23]. Although DoS attacks on Ethereum have been reported, there
lacks of a systematic study on the attacks and the defense mechanisms. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first work on defending against
under-priced DoS attacks on Ethereum.
BLOCKBENCH [12] is an evaluation framework for measuring the through-
put, latency, scalability and fault-tolerance of private blockchains. Yasaweeras-
inghelage et al. propose to predict the latency of blockchain-based applications
using architectural performance modeling and simulation tools [26]. However,
they [12,26] do not investigate the consumptions of computing resources for
executing EVM operations. OYENTE [18] is a symbolic executor for smart con-
tracts which discovers four types of security vulnerabilities. GASPER [9], based
on OYENTE, finds under-optimized smart contracts automatically that cost
more gas than necessary. A recent survey [3] reports that smart contracts suffer
from several kinds of vulnerabilities. One kind is gasless send, indicating that a
transaction sender may not consider the situation that sending Ether to another
account is possible to fail due to the out-of-gas exception. Sergey et al. reveal
that smart contracts will suffer from similar problems that often occur in transi-
tional concurrent programs [22]. However, they [18,9,3,22] do not consider DoS
attacks to Ethereum, which exploit under-priced EVM operations.
Verification is used for verifying the runtime safety and functional correctness
of smart contracts. Bhargavan et al. propose to translate a smart contract into
F?, a functional language before formal analysis [4]. Similarly, Pettersson and
Edstro¨m suggest developing smart contracts in Idris, a functional language, and
using type system to capture errors at compile time [20]. Hirai formally defines
EVM in Lem, an intermediate language similar to a functional language, facil-
itating further analysis and generation of smart contracts [13]. However, they
neither verify nor detect DoS attacks due to under-priced operations [4,20,13].
Hawk is a smart contract system protecting transactional privacy [16]. Town
Crier [27] aims at providing trustworthy data to smart contracts since they need
data out from the blockchain. Juels et al. report that smart contracts can be
used to commit crimes, such as privacy leakage, theft of cryptographic keys [15].
However, they [16,27,15] do not discuss the threats resulting from Ethereum DoS
attacks.
9 Conclusion
We investigate the gas cost setting in Ethereum because it could be exploited
to launch DoS attacks. By proposing an emulation-based framework to auto-
matically measure the resource consumptions of EVM operations, we find that
Ethereum does not assign proper gas costs to operations and it is difficult to
properly assign fixed gas costs to operations for defending against known and
unknown DoS attacks. Therefore, we propose a DoS-resistant gas cost mecha-
nism, which dynamically adjusts the costs of operations according to the number
of executions. Our approach is flexible and secure, and we design a special smart
contract that collaborates with the customized EVM to avoid frequently up-
dating Ethereum client. Experimental results show that our method effectively
thwarts known and unknown DoS attacks, and introduces negligible additional
gas to benign users.
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